This Article Full Text (PDF) References Alert me when this article is cited Alert me if a correction is posted Services Email this article to a friend Similar articles in this journal Alert me to new issues of the journal Add to Saved Citations Download to citation manager Request Permissions Request Reprints Add to My Marked Citations Citing Articles Citing Articles via HighWire Citing Articles via Google Scholar Citing Articles via Scopus Google Scholar Articles by Shean, G. D. Search for Related Content Social Bookmarking                         What's this?

Delusions, Self-Deception, and Intentionality

Psychology, P.O. Box 8795, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795.

This article illustrates how delusions can be understood as purposive attempts to create meaning, as constructions intended to preserve a sense of identity and social connectedness under extreme circumstances. The concepts of self-deception, purpose, and intentionality are discussed in the context of existential and moderate philosophical models in an attempt to resolve the paradoxes apparent in the application of concepts such as self-deception, intention, and purpose to phenomena widely understood as causally and pathologically determined. Excerpts from interviews with delusional psychiatric patients and the published statements of public figures are presented to illustrate how both can be understood in the context of Sartre's categories of self-deception. The implications of a model of self-deception that recognizes that the goals of delusional beliefs are on a continuum with those of everyday illusions are discussed. It is suggested that the different patterns and degrees of human irrationality and self-deception fall into a single spectrum rather than belonging to two radically different worlds.

Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 33, No. 1, 45-66 (1993)
DOI: 10.1177/0022167893331004


CiteULike    Complore    Connotea    Del.icio.us    Digg    Reddit    Technorati    Twitter    What's this?

This article has been cited by other articles:

				W. Mittelman Openness, Optimal Functioning, and Final Causes: A Further Reply to Tobacyk Journal of Humanistic Psychology, April 1, 1994; 34(2): 100 - 107. [Abstract]